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1 Introduction
Inflation expectations play a central role in modern macroeconomic models and are an
important factor for economic policy. Despite their importance, we still know relatively
little about how people form their expectations. Researchers have proposed a wide ar-
ray of frameworks to model the expectations formation process. Contributions by Sims
(2003), Mankiw and Reis (2002) or Woodford (2001) revived the interest in information
rigidities and highlight their importance for the process of forming inflation expectations.1
Accounting for imperfect information allows to solve several empirical puzzles that did
not match the predictions of the full-information rational expectations models, as shown
in Ball et al. (2005).2
While recent approaches have used micro survey data of professional forecasters to
identify the degree of information rigidities (Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013; An et al.,
2016), so far there is only little evidence for consumers. The idea of this paper is thus
to use the updating behavior regarding inflation expectations of individual consumers
in order to provide evidence of imperfect information using a better identification based
on micro survey data. We calculate the updating frequency over time and test which
macroeconomic factors trigger an adjustment of inflation expectations.3 In doing so,
we empirically test the relevance of theoretical imperfect information models, such as
rational inattention as proposed by Sims (2003) or sticky information as introduced by
Mankiw and Reis (2002). Furthermore, we explore if updating improves forecast accuracy
of expectations.
For our analysis we make use of the rotating panel microstructure of the University of
Michigan Survey of Consumers, where a fraction of individuals is re-interviewed after six
months. This allows us to track individuals and their expectations with two observations
over a period of six months. Hence, we can directly calculate the change in individual
expectations and the share of individuals that have adjusted their expectations and, thus,
1Similarly, the literature on the importance of learning for the expectation formation process discusses
how individuals use past data to learn about the true data generating process over time (Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001; Malmendier and Nagel, 2016).
2For an overview see also Mankiw and Reis (2011).
3Note that we discussed the dataset and the calculation of the updating shares in Dräger and Lamla
(2012). Consequently, in this paper we focus on whether we can explain the movements in the updating
frequencies and explore the consequences for forecast accuracy.
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do not need to rely on identification coming only from the cross section or the aggregated
series.
In Dräger and Lamla (2012) we have shown that there is a pronounced time variation
in the updating frequency. This pronounced time-variation in the qualitative expectation
updating share calls into question the assumption of a constant λ in standard sticky in-
formation models and favors noisy information models or time-varying sticky information
models. While this is interesting per se as it is useful for providing guidance in calibrating
the updating probability in sticky information models, it does not tell us why we observe
this time variation. At a micro level, both sticky information and rational inattention
models posit that the optimal degree of attentiveness is a function of signals, such as the
volatility of the forecast variable and news (Sims, 2003; Reis, 2006). In this paper, we
thus test the evidence of imperfect information in consumers’ inflation expectations and
derive hypotheses from both rational inattention and sticky information models regarding
agents’ expectation updating behavior.
Our results provide evidence in favor of imperfect information, since we find that
measures of the volatility of inflation raise attention and consequently trigger an updating
of inflation expectations by consumers. In addition, we find support for news effects: If
people have heard news on inflation, they are more likely to adjust their expectations.
Moreover, we explore whether adjusting expectations has beneficial implications for
the accuracy of inflation expectations. Besides proving theories of rational attention it is
extremely relevant to check whether adjusting expectations has improved the situation of
individuals implying that they not only adjust expectations but improve the forecast and
thereby allow for better economic action in response to this adjustment. Indeed, we can
report that forecast accuracy increases if inflation expectations are adjusted.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses the rotating panel dimension of
the microdata in the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers to test for predictions
from theories of expectation formation under imperfect information regarding consumers’
inflation expectations. Nevertheless, there exist several approaches in the literature that
test consumers’ expectation formation for evidence of information frictions in aggregate
data. For the US, Carroll (2003) finds support in aggregate survey data for the conjecture
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of Mankiw and Reis (2002) that consumers update their quantitative inflation expecta-
tions roughly once a year. For Europe, Döpke et al. (2008a) estimate that consumers
update their inflation expectations once every 18 months.4 Mankiw et al. (2003) as well
as Branch (2007) use aggregate survey data of consumers’ inflation expectations to test for
specific features of the sticky information model, while Lamla and Sarferaz (2012) docu-
ment substantial time-variation in the inflation expectation updating behavior of German
households.
Additionally, there exists evidence of information frictions in micro survey data for pro-
fessional forecasters: Using microdata for inflation expectations of professional forecasters,
Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) report evidence of information frictions as forecasters show
staggered updating of expectations and persistent disagreement. An et al. (2016) use a
similar measure to derive an aggregate inattention measure from professional forecasters’
inattention to several variables and report substantial time-variation in inattention over
the business cycle. Looking at the movements of forecast errors in relation to the vari-
able being forecasted, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015) document pervasive and
robust evidence consistent with information rigidities and derive a test for information
frictions consistent under both sticky information and models of imperfect information as
in Woodford (2001). Similarly, Dovern et al. (2015) use a related approach with both ag-
gregate and individual survey data of professional forecasts in a large country panel. Our
approach differs from these studies in that we focus on consumers’ expectations. Specif-
ically, we employ the rotating panel feature of the Michigan Survey for Consumers to
identify updates in inflation expectations and derive hypotheses from limited information
theories that we test in the regression analysis. We therefore focus on the determinants
of the likelihood of an individual expectation update.
So far, only a few studies use the rotating panel dimension of the University of Michigan
Survey of Consumers. Souleles (2004) employs the rotating panel to construct individual
forecast errors, which are then subjected to rationality tests and evaluated with respect to
their forecasting power regarding household expenditure. Anderson et al. (2010) analyze
differences in the formation of consumers’ inflation expectations and their forecast errors
4For evidence regarding the expectations updating by professional forecasters, see Döpke et al. (2008b).
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conditional on sociodemographic characteristics. Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) test the
hypotheses of the epidemiology model proposed by Carroll (2003). Finally, Bachmann
et al. (2015) test for a possible link between individual consumers’ inflation expectations
and their reported readiness to spend on large consumer goods.
The paper is structured as follows. We discuss models with imperfect information
in section 2, where we derive our hypotheses for the empirical analysis. In section 3
we discuss the data set used in the analysis. Empirical results regarding the updating
behavior of individual inflation expectations and their forecast errors are presented in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Determinants of Imperfect Information
In order to derive testable hypotheses for individuals’ updating behavior, we present
two simple models of inflation expectations under imperfect information. Following the
seminal paper by Sims (2003), models of rational inattention assume that individuals
are constrained in their capacity to acquire and process information and, hence, may
not be able to form full information rational expectations. Some information is observed
each period and individuals may choose where to allocate their limited attention, so
that the updating of expectations becomes a function of signals. In a related class of
models, the sticky information model by Mankiw and Reis (2002) assumes that agents
underly a constant probability of being able to update their information set each period.
Nevertheless, the optimal updating frequency at the micro level also depends on signals
(Reis, 2006). Our test hypotheses derived from the models below account for aspects of
both rational inattention and sticky information models. Hence, we test for the relevance
of imperfect information models in general and do not aim at discriminating between
different approaches of modeling imperfect information.
The structure of the first model presented here follows closely the example in Wieder-
holt (2010), who presents a model of price setting under rational inattention. Since
individuals may update their expectations each period, the model can be written as a
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static problem, omitting time indices. Suppose that the full information rational forecast
of inflation, pie,∗, is given by:
pie,∗ = θ∆, (1)
where ∆ ∼ N(0, σ2∆) is a combination of aggregate shocks driving inflation, which is
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2∆, and θ is a parameter.
Individuals cannot fully observe pie,∗. However, if they choose to pay attention to inflation,
they will receive an individual signal si = ∆ + εi, where the idiosyncratic noise εi is
independent from aggregate shocks ∆ and is also assumed to be normally distributed
as ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε), so that si is multivariate normal. Note that the individual signals si
may be interpreted as active searching for information on the part of individuals. Thus,
individuals’ inflation forecast, piei , can be stated as:
piei = E [pi
e,∗|si] (2)
Next, the amount of information conveyed in the signal is measured as a reduction in
uncertainty. In line with information theory, uncertainty is measured by the entropy of
a random variable. In our model with Gaussian shocks, entropy of a random variable
x ∼ N(0, σ2x) is given by:
H(x) =
1
2
log2
(
2pieσ2x
)
(3)
Similarly, the conditional entropy of x given the signal si can be written as:
H(x|si) = 1
2
log2
(
2pieσ2x|si
)
(4)
where σ2x|si is the conditional variance of x given si. Hence, the amount of information on
x in si, called mutual information, is given by the change in entropies conditional on the
observation of the signal:
I(x; si) = H(x)−H(x|si) (5)
5
Inflation in the model is driven by aggregate shocks ∆, so that we replace x with ∆
to get the mutual information in the signals si on inflation shocks ∆. When forecasting
inflation under less than full information, individuals thus incur a loss, since an inaccurate
inflation forecast leads for instance to suboptimal pricing decisions or wage negotiations.
Hence, individuals aim at minimizing these losses subject to their information processing
constraint. We assume that individuals can choose both the amount of attention κ, paid to
inflation at a cost µ, and the signals obtained. Additionally, we assume that the marginal
cost µ of an additional unit of attention devoted to inflation is a negative function of public
news on inflation, N , as perceived by the individual: µ(N) with µ′(N) < 0.5 We argue
that this effect reflects passive learning about inflation developments, for instance via
the exposure to media news, which then reduces the individual marginal cost of actively
searching for information on inflation. Hence, the problem of optimal inattention can be
stated as follows:
min
σ2
∆|si ,κ≥0
E∆,si
[
(piei − pie,∗)2
]
+ µ(N)κ (6)
subject to equations (1) and (2), si = ∆ + εi and the information constraint
1
2
log2
(
2pieσ2∆
)− 1
2
log2
(
2pieσ2∆|si
) ≤ κ (7)
Agents minimize (6) over the joint distribution of the true inflation state and the signal,
where the joint distribution is chosen to be Gaussian due to the assumption of Gaussian
states.6 This gives an expression for optimal attention towards inflation:
κ∗ =

1
2
log2
(
2 ln(2)θ2σ2∆
µ(N)
)
if 2 ln(2)θ
2σ2∆
µ(N)
≥ 1
0 otherwise
(8)
5The cost of attention µ may also vary across demographic characteristics and could, for instance, be
lower for individuals with a higher economic and financial literacy. Here, we make the simplifying as-
sumption that µ is not heterogeneous across agents, but in the regression analysis control for demographic
factors.
6The full derivation of the optimality problem and the optimal degree of attention is given in the
appendix.
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where the fraction (2 ln(2)θ2σ2∆)/µ(N) gives the marginal benefit of paying attention to in-
flation. From equation (8), we can thus state two hypotheses regarding attention towards
inflation:7
H1: Under rational inattention, updates of inflation expectations, i.e. atten-
tion towards inflation, should be a positive function of the variance of inflation
forecasts under full information θ2σ2∆, which is driven by the variance of ag-
gregate shocks on inflation.
H2: Under rational inattention, attention towards inflation should be a posi-
tive function of news N regarding inflation perceived by the individual, since
these reduce the marginal cost µ of devoting attention to inflation.
A related approach to implications of imperfect information can be found in Dräger
(2016) in a model which bridges models of rational inattention and of sticky information.
In line with the literature on heterogeneous expectations, individuals in the model in
Dräger (2016) may choose between two forecasts of inflation, where one forecast is formed
under full information (EFI), while the second forecast is formed with outdated (sticky)
information (ESI). The aggregate expectations index for inflation expectations is then
given by:
E˜t(pi) ≡ λpitEFIt (pi) + (1− λpit )ESIt (pi) = λpitEt(pi) + (1− λpit )λ
∞∑
j=0
(1− λ)jEt−1−j(pi), (9)
where λpit is the endogenous and time-varying probability of choosing the full information
forecast of inflation. The model thus derives a version of a sticky information model.
Moreover, the model also incorporates aspects of rational inattention, since attention as
captured by λpit may change every period. Individuals are assumed to base their decision
for a forecast on its forecast performance, measured by the respective squared forecast
7Note that Reis (2006) derives at a similar conclusion regarding the determinants of consumers’ op-
timal degree of inattentiveness in a model with sticky information. However, in contrast to models of
rational inattention, the concept of sticky information assumes that forecasts are only updated within
fixed intervals, so that the model in Reis (2006) yields in fact the optimal inattentiveness interval.
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errors. Additionally, full information can only be obtained at a fixed cost CFI , which has
to be paid each period. Forecast attractiveness is thus given by the expressions:
V FIt = (pit−1 − Et−2pit)2 + CFI (10)
V SIt =
(
pit−1 − λ
∞∑
j=0
(1− λ)jEt−j−3pit
)2
(11)
The probability of choosing the full information forecast, given by each forecast’s at-
tractiveness from equations (10) and (11) is then modeled as a choice of two discrete
alternatives under rational inattention. This implies that although individuals have some
information on the predictors’ accuracy, there remains some uncertainty regarding the
optimal forecast or the true values in V = (V FI , V SI). As shown in Matějka and McKay
(2011), the probability of forecasting inflation with full information is in this case given
by a multinominal logit model:8
λpit =
exp(V FIt /µ)
exp(V FIt /µ) + exp(V SIt /µ)
, (12)
where µ is the cost of a unit of information derived above. From this model, we can thus
state the third hypothesis regarding attention towards inflation:
H3: Under imperfect information and with a choice between costly new in-
formation or costless outdated information, attention towards inflation should
increase with higher past forecast errors regarding inflation.9
All three hypotheses H1-H3 thus formulate testable hypotheses for evidence of imper-
fect information in expectation formation and will be brought to the data in the empirical
analysis of consumers’ inflation expectations below.
8Detailed derivations are given in Matějka and McKay (2011).
9Note that although they are derived from different models, hypotheses H1 and H3 are related in the
sense that under imperfect information an increase in the variance of inflation is likely to also increase
the forecast error, since expectations do not comove perfectly with the actual data.
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3 The Data
We analyze microdata from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, which is
available for the sample period January 1978 to November 2011. Since October 1987,
each month a sample of about 500 households is interviewed, where the sample is chosen
to statistically represent households in the US, excluding Alaska and Hawaii.10 Sample
sizes before 1987m10 were about 600-1400 interviews per month from 1978m1-1980m2,
and about 600-700 interviews per month from 1980m3-1987m9.11
For the analysis of the dynamics of individuals’ inflation expectations, we exploit the
fact that the Michigan Survey of Consumers includes a rotating panel: Each month, a
randomly determined sub-sample of households is chosen to be re-interviewed six months
after the first interview. The complete cross-section each month includes about 40% of
individuals that are interviewed for the second time. Via the rotating panel structure of
the survey, we are thus able to identify changes in expectations on an individual consumer
level. In this paper, we use cross-sections from October 1987 onwards. This allows us to
exclude any effects from the downward trend in inflation during the disinflation period
and the simultaneous monetary policy shocks on our results, and ensures a homogeneous
sample size of about 400 individuals within the rotating panel each month.12
In order to identify individual changes in inflation expectations at a micro level, we fol-
low Souleles (2004) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) and restrict our sample to households
where the same person answered both interviews. Additionally, we control for extreme
values for inflation expectations by truncating our sample at the upper and lower 2.5% of
the distribution of both short- and long-run quantitative inflation expectations.
For the evaluation of changes in individuals’ inflation expectations, we are able to
exploit the fact that, in addition to a qualitative question asking about expectations
regarding “prices in general”, the Michigan Survey includes questions asking for a quanti-
tative estimate of expected inflation. Moreover, the survey allows to distinguish between
10Interviews generally take place in the first half of each month.
11For further details on the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, see
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu.
12For a discussion on the selection of the sample using the MSC see Carvalho and Nechio (2014) and
Dräger et al. (2016). We check for robustness of our results with respect to the sample period and present
estimations for our main results with the full sample period in section 4.4.
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individuals’ expectations regarding inflation during the next year and expectations at a
longer horizon of five to ten years. The precise questions of the survey read:
A12. "During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go
up, or go down, or stay where they are now?"
1. GO UP 3. STAY THE SAME 5. GO DOWN 8. DON’T KNOW
A12b. "By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the
average, during the next 12 months?"
A13. "What about the outlook for prices over the next 5 to 10 years? Do you
think prices will be higher, about the same, or lower, 5 to 10 years from
now?"
1. HIGHER 3. STAY THE SAME 5. LOWER 8. DON’T KNOW
A13b. "By about what percent per year do you expect prices to go (up/down)
on the average, during the next 5 to 10 years?"
As we are interested in evaluating the role of information frictions for the formation
of inflation expectations, we employ the question in the Michigan Survey of Consumers
asking for news on the economy heard by the respondent as a measure of perceived news
regarding inflation. The wording of the question is as follows:
A6. "During the last few months, have you heard of any favorable or unfavor-
able changes in business conditions?"
1. YES 2. NO
If the question is answered with "yes", an open question with two possible answers
follows:
A6a. "What did you hear? (Have you heard of any other favorable or unfavor-
able changes in business conditions?)"
The answers are coded into categories by the Michigan Survey of Consumers. For our
purposes, we construct a dummy variable “newsheard” if the consumer reports having
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heard any news on business conditions in general, and a dummy “newsprices” which takes
on the value of 1 if the respondent reported news heard on either “falling prices/deflation”,
“high prices/inflation”, “higher prices/inflation is good” or “lower, stable prices/less infla-
tion” and zero otherwise. Additionally, we distinguish between news heard about high and
low inflation or prices with the dummy variables “newsprices_high” and “newsprices_low”.
In order to be able to distinguish between favorable or unfavorable news regarding infla-
tion, we further construct the dummy variables “newsprices_bad” and “newsprices_good”.
We code news on “higher prices/inflation is good” and on “lower, stable prices/less infla-
tion” as favorably perceived by the respondent, while the other two categories are coded
as unfavorable news.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Monthly Shares of Consumers Reporting News Heard
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Share newsheard 58,552 0.60 0.10 0.39 0.87
Share newsprices 58,552 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.36
Share newsprices_high 58,552 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.36
Share newsprices_low 58,552 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11
Share newsprices_bad 58,552 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.36
Share newsprices_good 58,552 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11
Notes: Results for the sample period from 1987m10-2011m11. Obs denotes the sample size, SD is
the standard deviation while Min and Max represent the minimum and maximum values.
From the summary statistics in Table 1 we observe that on average about 60% of the
people surveyed report having heard news on business conditions in general, while only 5%
heard news on price developments. These are mainly news about rising prices, which are
mostly perceived as bad news. While this seems a rather small number, one should note
that survey participants can only state two news items and that news on prices competes
along other important economic and political dimensions like employment, taxes, fiscal
debt, etc. In addition, the price movements in our sample have been quite moderate
and inflation fears are not expected to have dominated the economic debate throughout.
Nevertheless, we also note substantial time variation in all shares reporting news, with
maximum shares of up to one third observing news on inflation. As shown in Figure A.1 in
the Appendix, consumers generally observe more news during recessionary periods. This
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is also the case with news on price changes, where we additionally observe an increased
number of reported news from the mid-2000s to the end of the Great Recession.
Furthermore, we employ a number of sociodemographic control variables from the
Michigan Survey of Consumers in the following analyses, such as age and sex of the
respondent as well as income quartiles and a categorical variable measuring education
of the respondent in six categories. These are defined as follows: Educ1 – “Grade 0-8,
no high school diploma”, Educ2 – “Grade 9-12, no high school diploma”, Educ3 – “Grade
0-12, with high school diploma”, Educ4 – “4 yrs. of college, no degree”, Educ5 – “3 yrs.
of college, with degree” and Educ6 – “4 yrs. of college, with degree”.
In addition to the microdata from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we employ
monthly data on actual U.S. CPI inflation from the FRED database of the St. Louis
FED. Monthly data for Treasury-bill constant maturity secondary market rates is also
extracted from the FRED database. We further use quarterly data of inflation expecta-
tions regarding U.S. inflation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which
is available from 1981q3 onwards for one-year-ahead inflation forecasts, and from 1991q4
onwards for ten-years-ahead inflation forecasts. Finally, we account for the attention of
the media to topics related to U.S. inflation with the number of articles published on U.S.
inflation in the New York Times. This measure of external information is obtained from
the media research institute MediaTenor and is available on a monthly basis from 1998m1
to 2011m5.13
4 Results
4.1 The Individual Updating Frequency of Inflation Expectations
As a first step, we calculate the share of individuals in each monthly cross-section that
adjusted their expectations, denoted as “updating share”.14 In line with the literature, we
interpret the updating share as the share of individuals which updated their information,
and, hence, also their expectations. However, it should be noted that in theory it might be
13This data is coded by humans following the standards of media content analysis. Unfortunately, the
dataset starts only in 1998m1 and an extension further into the past is outside the scope of this paper.
14The analysis in this subsection builds on Dräger and Lamla (2012).
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possible to update information on inflation and nevertheless keep expectations constant
on the basis of new information. While we cannot verify this possibility, we note that
in this case the updating share represents the lower bound of the monthly number of
individuals which updated their information regarding inflation. Due to the nature of
the survey, a further caveat applies: The Michigan Survey asks for forecasts for a fixed
horizon of 12 months ahead, instead of forecasts with a fixed target date, say December
of that year. Hence, 12-months-ahead expectations after six months have an overlapping
forecasting horizon of only six months with the previous 12-months-ahead expectations,
so that changes in expectations may occur even if the consumer remained inattentive.
This could lead to overestimation of the updating frequency.
The updating share is calculated for both short- and long-run inflation expectations
captured by both the qualitative and the quantitative answers. Summary statistics are
given in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Monthly Updating Shares for Inflation Expectations
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Short-run expectations, 1 year 289 0.74 0.06 0.60 0.87
Short-run expectations, 1 year, qualitative answer 289 0.38 0.09 0.16 0.67
Long-run expectations, 5-10 years 255 0.72 0.06 0.57 0.86
Long-run expectations, 5-10 years, qualitative answer 255 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.34
Notes: Results for the sample period from 1987m10-2011m11. Obs denotes the sample size, SD is
the standard deviation while Min and Max represent the minimum and maximum values.
According to our calculations, individuals in the Michigan survey on average update
their one-year-ahead inflation expectations based on the quantitative question every 8
months and every 16 months based on the qualitative question.15 Regarding long-run
inflation expectations, the updating frequencies vary between 8 and 36 months based
on the quantitative and the qualitative question, respectively. Overall, we find higher
updating frequencies using the answers to the quantitative question as reported in the
15As is standard in the literature, the average updating frequency is derived from the updating shares
by assuming that all consumers have the same likelihood of an expectations adjustment. Thereby, an
updating share of, e.g., 0.74 over six months is equivalent to a share of 0.123 over one month. The
monthly updating frequency is then given by the inverse, which gives roughly 8 months.
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literature from aggregate data.16 Using the population mean of quantitative inflation
expectations from U.S. surveys, Carroll (2003) estimates an updating share of roughly
0.25 over a quarter, corresponding to a value of 0.5 over six months. This implies that
expectations are updated once within a year. For Europe, using qualitative survey data,
Döpke et al. (2008a) report a somewhat lower updating frequency than that in the U.S.: A
typical household updates its inflation expectations roughly once in eighteen months. One
possible explanation for our result of a higher updating frequency at the micro level may
be related to the aggregation phenomenon. The effect that aggregation of individual data
series reduces the variability of the underlying microdata and increases its persistence is
a known result, e.g. from movements in price indices (Altissimo et al., 2007). Another
explanation for the difference in updating frequencies might come from the fact that
updating frequencies in aggregate data cannot simply be calculated as in our microdata,
but must be estimated. The studies in Carroll (2003) and Döpke et al. (2008a) estimate an
epidemiology model, where consumers are assumed to update their inflation expectations
towards professionals’ forecast. By contrast, our measure directly calculates changes in
individual expectations without referring to any theoretical model.
Notably, the difference in the updating frequency between the qualitative and quanti-
tative answers is quite remarkable. Given the way the questions are phrased, this suggests
that individuals fine-tune their quantitative expectations very regularly (even though the
Michigan Survey reports only full integer expectations), but update their qualitative ex-
pectations much less frequently. In line with central banks’ definition of price stability
as inflation in the range of 2%, consumers who expect low inflation rates might answer
“prices stay the same” and only move into the “prices increase” category once they expect
higher inflation rates, and vice versa for prices expected to be “lower”. An update in an
individual’s qualitative inflation expectations should thus be viewed as a larger change in
expected inflation. Indeed, consumers might update their information set, but neverthe-
less decide not to change their qualitative assessment of expected inflation. This implies
16The Michigan Survey imposes that quantitative inflation expectations be stated as full numbers,
excluding decimals. Therefore, an update of quantitative inflation expectations implies a change of at
least one percentage point. Hence, we capture as “updating” already a meaningful deviation from the
preceding forecast. In order to test whether more substantial changes have different effects, we also
analyze updating frequencies with expectation changes larger than 1 or 5 percentage points. Results are
presented in the robustness section 4.4.
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that qualitative inflation expectation updates should co-move with substantial adjust-
ments in the quantitative assessment. Indeed, as shown in Figure A.2 in the appendix,
updating shares calculated from quantitative inflation expectations with absolute changes
larger than 1% or 5% are closer to the updating share of qualitative expectations. Alter-
natively, the high updating share reported from the quantitative question might also be
a hint to macroeconomic illiteracy or memory loss (Blanchflower and Kelly, 2008): Some
individuals might not have changed their view on inflation, but fail to recall the exact
number reported six months ago. This might introduce some measurement error in the
rather high updating share for quantitative expectations.
To test the hypothesis of fine-tuning, we check whether the mean change in quan-
titative expectations is smaller if there is no change in the qualitative assessment. For
this purpose we employ comparison of mean tests with different variances. Conducting
those tests, we find support for the hypothesis that quantitative changes are indeed sig-
nificantly smaller if the qualitative response did not change.17 This implies that the high
updating frequency identified from the quantitative answer represents mainly only very
gradual adjustments, where larger adjustments occur when qualitative expectations are
adjusted as well. To test the hypothesis with regard to macroeconomic illiteracy, we check
whether updating of inflation expectations improves the forecast accuracy. If updating
significantly alters forecast errors, this should hint to a sufficient degree of macroeco-
nomic literacy and hence imply that the updating we identify is indeed something very
meaningful. The results of this analysis are presented in the upcoming section.
Coming back to the different results presented in the literature for the updating
propensity of U.S. and European consumers, our study allows for an insight that challenges
this result. In fact, our data suggests that this difference between U.S. and European con-
sumers might be driven by the type of survey data available: Qualitative vs. quantitative
data. In the above paragraph, the results of Döpke et al. (2008a) indicate that European
consumers are more sluggish in adjusting their expectations than US consumers. This
result is based on qualitative data, while the results for the U.S. are based on quantitative
17Test statistics equality of means t-test with unequal variances and with H0: difference of means=0.
One-year expectations: t-value=-32.81, Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom=16808, p-value=0.000; test
5-10 years expectations: t-value=-19.79, Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom=3692.68, p-value=0.000
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data. If we now consider that our results for the U.S. show that qualitative expecta-
tions are adjusted less frequently than quantitative expectations, the reported difference
in those studies comparing European and U.S. consumers may be only driven by the fact
that different types of survey data were used and consequently may imply that the US
and Europe have very similar updating frequencies.
Long-run expectations are adjusted less often than short-run expectations at least in
the case of qualitative expectations, and hence seem more firmly anchored on average.
Long-run expectations should not be affected much by business cycle effects, but rather
be related to fundamental factors. Such fundamentals might include the long-run stance
of monetary policy, for instance with respect to an inflation target. Notably, the high
updating share for long-run quantitative inflation expectations may again be affected by
fine-tuning or macroeconomic illiteracy.
Our results may be useful to the calibration of structural parameters in sticky infor-
mation models. In their quarterly model, Mankiw and Reis (2002) assume a constant
expectations updating probability of λ = 0.25, which means that consumers update their
inflation expectations on average once a year. Our results then point out important
implications for the calibration of λ in sticky information models: First of all, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the updating of quantitative and qualitative expectations
(i.e., fine-tuning vs substantial adjustments), since the more frequent updates in quanti-
tative inflation expectations would imply a value of λ = 0.37, while the more substantial
adjustments in qualitative expectations give λ = 0.19. Second, if expectation updates
in sticky information models should capture a more substantial adjustment of inflation
expectations, λ should be calibrated at the lower value around λ = 0.19.
Next, we plot the share of households that update their inflation expectations over
time together with a smoothing polynomial trend, shown in Figure 1. Several approaches
in the literature report evidence that updating shares regarding inflation expectations
in the population may vary substantially over time. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)
show that the information rigidity changes over the business cycle and Lamla and Sarferaz
(2012) relate the variation of the updating speed for expectations of German consumers to
uncertainty and news effects. Finding time-varying updating frequencies would contradict
16
Figure 1: Updating Shares for Inflation Expectations
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(a) Short-run expectations, 1 year
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(b) Short-run expectations, 1 year, qualitative
answer
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(c) Long-run expectations, 5-10 years
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(d) Long-run expectations, 5-10 years, qualita-
tive answer
Notes: The graphs show the share of individual consumers that change their inflation expectations
within six months together with a smoothing polynomial trend. Shaded areas are recession phases
as identified by the NBER. The share is calculated by taking all individuals that adjusted their
expectations during the last six months and dividing them by the overall number of individuals
that have been re-interviewed.
the assumptions in sticky information models, where the aggregate updating share of
individuals is assumed to stay constant over time. By contrast, rational inattention models
assume that agents may update their expectations every period.
Looking at the changes in qualitative one-year-ahead inflation expectations, we can
observe substantial variation in the updating share, which fluctuates between about 20%
and 60%. Interestingly, we see relatively strong surges during recessionary periods. Es-
pecially from 2008 onwards, the share of individuals that updated their inflation expec-
tations rose substantially. The cyclical pattern is also present in the updating share of
quantitative short-run expectations, albeit less pronounced. Hence, our results imply that
aggregate sticky information models miss some properties of the expectation formation
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process. Aternatively, our results may give empirical motivation to other models, e.g.,
hybrid models with time-varying sticky information as in Dräger (2016).
Regarding the updating shares of long-run inflation expectations, we find significantly
less time-variation compared to one-year-ahead inflation expectations. Fundamentals and
the monetary policy stance should not change often and hence a rather constant updating
share has to be expected. Unfortunately, the question on long-run inflation expectations
was not included in every monthly survey before October 1990, leading to missing values
in the time series of the updating shares. For the following regression analysis, we thus
restrict the sample period for individual long-run inflation expectations to a start in
October 1990.
Furthermore, we are interested in the determinants of updating, which we will evaluate
in more detail in the regression analysis of the following section. One important source
might be news observed by the consumer. In Table 3 we conduct a quick inspection
on whether expectations on inflation move in a sensible way with respect to news heard
on inflation. Indeed, we can confirm that consumers adjust their expectations as would
be expected: If people hear news on rising prices or inflation, they will increase their
quantitative inflation expectations and if they hear news on falling inflation, they will
adjust their inflation expectations downwards. These changes are significant at least at
the 5% level. Additionally, we observe that the absolute forecast error of people that hear
news on higher inflation is much higher than that of people hearing news of lower inflation
(see Table 12 in section 4.3).
Table 3: Response of Quantitative Inflation Expectations to News on Prices
Variable Mean SD Obs T-Test
News heard on high prices/inflation
Change in short-run quantitative expectations 0.589 6.229 926 2.875***
News heard low prices/inflation
Change in short-run quantitative expectations -1.198 6.506 177 -2.449**
Notes: The table shows changes in individual quantitative short-run inflation expectations in the
case of an update, conditional on news observed by the consumer. Results are for the sample
period from 1987m10-2011m11. SD is the standard deviation and Obs denotes the sample size.
The t-statistic gives the result of a test against the null hypothesis that the change in expectations
is equal to zero. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% level, respectively.
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4.2 Explaining Adjustments in Inflation Expectations
In this section, we link the updating behavior regarding inflation expectations to possible
determinants derived from the theories of imperfect information discussed in section 2.
Specifically, we estimate pooled cross-section probit models for the propensity to update
both individual quantitative and qualitative short- and long-run inflation expectations in
the second interview, including aggregate regressors derived from the theoretical models
as well as demographic factors.
From the simple model of rational inattention regarding inflation derived in section
2, we get our first hypothesis H1, stating that attentiveness towards inflation should be
affected by the variance of inflation forecasts under full information, i.e. the variance of
actual inflation. This result is also presented in Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) in
a rational inattention model of price setting and in Reis (2006) in a sticky information
model. In order to test for H1, we thus include both the variability of actual inflation and
of professional forecasters’ inflation outlook from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
as determinants for the probability of an update of inflation expectations. We argue that
the latter may be regarded as the best available forecast and, thus, as a proxy for the
full information forecast even though professional forecasters may also potentially suffer
from information rigidities. Actual inflation volatility is calculated as the sum of squared
monthly changes of inflation from t − 2 to t − 8, while the volatility of professionals’
forecasts comes from squared changes in the last two quarters. Information on both
measures is thus available to all consumers interviewed in month t. According to H1, if
the variability of either actual inflation or professional forecasts increases, people should
pay more attention to inflation and, thus, have an increased probability to update their
expectations. Additionally, we test for an effect of the volatility of mean forecasts from
month t− 2 to t− 8 over all consumers.
Next, we attempt to evaluate hypothesis H2 from the rational inattention model by
testing for the effect of news on individuals’ updating behavior. Hypothesis H2 states
that attention towards inflation should be a positive function of news regarding inflation,
as these should lower the marginal cost of attention and, thus, increase the probability
of an update. This is in line for instance with arguments in Lamla and Sarferaz (2012).
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We account for news effects by including the change in the number of news on inflation
in the media over the last six months and the individual change between interviews in
the variable stating whether the individual observed any news on business conditions
in general and on inflation in particular. We thus disentangle the sender and receiver
perspective regarding the news. Additionally, we also account for possible asymmetries,
e.g. that news heard on high inflation might be more likely to trigger an adjustment of
expectations compared to news on low or falling inflation.
Finally, we test for evidence regarding hypothesis H3, which was derived from the
model in Dräger (2016). Under H3, the probability of updating inflation expectations
should be positively affected by an increase in individuals’ own past forecast errors, since
the predictor formed with outdated information becomes less attractive, the higher its
forecast error. We thus include the absolute individual forecast error from the first inter-
view as an explanatory variable for the propensity to update expectations in the second
interview. Notably, as we have only a six-months lag between both interviews, the forecast
error from six months ago has not been fully realized yet. Therefore, we calculate annu-
alized inflation during the six months between the interviews and a hypothetical absolute
forecast error assuming that individuals forecast this realized annualized inflation instead
of 12-months ahead inflation in the first interview. This measure is used to instrument
the individual absolute forecast error reported in the first interview.
Tables 4-10 comprise the estimation results for the probability of updating inflation
expectations. Tables 4-7 show models including different measures of inflation volatility
as well as individual absolute forecast errors as determinants for the updating of both
short- and long-run quantitative and qualitative inflation expectations, where Tables 6-7
test for non-linear effects of inflation volatility. In a second set of tables, i.e. Tables
8 and 9, we test for the effects of different news variables. Finally, Table 10 tests for
asymmetric effects between consumers that increase or decrease their inflation forecast
in the second interview. All tables report marginal effects evaluated with the remaining
variables being held at their means, with standard errors clustered at the year level and
all models additionally include demographic controls such as age and sex of respondent
as well as education and income groups. Overall, we find that the suggested explanatory
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variables can explain more of the short-run updating behavior than the long-run updating
behavior. This is certainly in line with our expectations. Long-run expectations should be
more related to fundamental factors that vary only little over time and are not sufficiently
captured by our set of determinants. We focus here on the results regarding the updating
of short-run inflation expectations and show regressions with long-run expectations in the
Appendix.
Regarding the updating of short-run inflation expectations, we find that an increase
in the volatility of professionals’ inflation forecasts significantly increases the probability
of an update of both individual quantitative and qualitative inflation expectations. Gen-
erally, we thus find evidence in favor of H1 and, hence, in favor of imperfect information.
The existence of imperfect information can further imply a non-linear effect of the fore-
casted variable’s variance (conditional on other factors) on the updating of expectations,
as shown in equation (8). Individuals pay attention if a certain threshold is reached. This
might affect our results in the linear additive framework we are estimating. To account
for the possible non-linearity in the simplest way, we add squared terms of our inflation
variance measures. If the threshold is non-binding at low levels, but binding at higher
levels of the observed variance, we should observe a significant squared term. By contrast,
if the threshold already binds at very low levels of the variance, only the level effect should
be significant. Results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 and depicted in Figure 2. Account-
ing for a non-linear impact of the inflation variance has no effect on our news variable
as it stays significant for quantitative expectations and remains irrelevant for qualitative
expectations. Looking at our measures of inflation variance, we observe that the squared
term of the CPI variance is highly significant for qualitative inflation expectations, indi-
cating that more people update their expectations once the CPI variance reaches a certain
threshold. For quantitative expectations we find no statistically significant evidence of
non-linearities. Figure 2 depicts marginal effects on the likelihood of an expectations
update at different values of the CPI variance. The left panel shows the marginal effect
for quantitative expectations, and the right figure depicts the same effect for qualitative
expectations. While both graphs suggest an increasing effect of higher levels of inflation
volatility on the likelihood of an update, this is only significant for qualitative expecta-
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tions. Overall, these results nicely re-enforce the notion of rational inattention. When we
analyze the variance of inflation expectations of professional forecasters, it appears that
the threshold is rather low as the squared term is insignificant. The effect of the variance
of inflation expectations of consumers remains insignificant.
With respect to the hypothesis H3, we find that own past forecast errors from the
first interview positively affect the probability of an expectations update in the second
interview in all models in Tables 4-5. In line with H3, this suggests that consumers’ own
forecast accuracy may be used as a signal regarding the benefit of an information update.
Evaluating the news measures, we can report that news affect the propensity to update
quantitative short-run inflation expectations only. More specifically, in the case of quanti-
tative expectations, there is a significant impact of a change in perceived news on business
conditions in general, as well as on prices changes. Our result of no significant effect of
news on long-run inflation expectations can be interpreted as a high degree of anchoring
of long-run expectations. Regarding the short-run, and knowing that a qualitative change
implies a stronger movement in quantitative expectations, we can interpret the results to
imply that news affect mainly smaller adjustments in inflation expectations, while larger
adjustment can be better explained by our volatility measures and the realized forecast
error. Overall, we thus find some tentative evidence in favor of H2.18
Finally, we test whether our results for H1-H3 depend on the direction of inflation ex-
pectation updates. We define a new dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the consumer
reports an increase in short-run quantitative inflation expectations at the second inter-
view, and a value of 0 if a decrease in expectations is reported. No change in expectations
is coded as a missing value. The results in Table 10 show the marginal effects for the
likelihood of reporting an increase in expected inflation. We observe that consumers are
more likely to increase their inflation expectations, if they observe news on price changes.
Since news observed by consumers are mostly news about price increases, we would ex-
pect that these news induce consumers to increase, rather than decrease, their inflation
18Overall, the suggested models can explain little of the overall variation as measured by the pseudo
R2 despite a large number of demographic control variables, suggesting a large degree of heterogeneity
in the dataset. Notably, Bachmann et al. (2015) testing the determinants of spending in the same survey
report very low R2s as well.
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expectations.19 Interestingly, the effect of inflation volatility becomes insignificant when
we distinguish between positive and negative updates. Higher absolute forecast errors in
the first interview lead consumers to reduce their inflation expectations. Since consumers
generally tend to overestimate inflation during our sample period, a reduction of their
forecast after observing a larger error would be consistent.
Table 4: Updating One-Year-Ahead Quantitative Inflation Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5)1
∆(Newsprices)it 0.014* 0.015* 0.015* 0.053** 0.051**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.025)
σ2pi,t−2 0.002 -0.008
(0.002) (0.006)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.073*** 0.116***
(0.013) (0.043)
σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.008)
AFEi,t−6 0.087*** 0.089***
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 24,021 24,021 24,021 23,802 23,802
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00117 0.00156 0.00123
Wald test for exogeneity 4.411 6.669
Prob. 0.0357 0.00981
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 1 IV probit estimated with maxi-
mum likelihood. ∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have
changed their opinion on news heard over prices with respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−2
denotes the sum of squared changes of inflation over from months t-2 to t-8. σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
rep-
resents the sum of squared changes of inflation expectations of professional forecasters in
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
denotes
the sum of squared changes of mean inflation expectations of consumers in the Michigan
Survey from months t-2 to t-8. AFEi,t−6 stands for the individual absolute forecast error
made with the prediction of the first interview |(pit+6 − Ei,t−6(pit+6))|, instrumented with
the error made with the annualized 6-months inflation rate between the interviews.
19This is indeed shown to be the case in Table 3.
23
Table 5: Updating One-Year-Ahead Qualitative Inflation Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5)1
∆(Newsprices)it 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.006 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.039) (0.038)
σ2pi,t−2 0.008 0.002
(0.007) (0.019)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.116* 0.218
(0.060) (0.147)
σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
0.009 0.012
(0.007) (0.022)
AFEi,t−6 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 25,349 25,349 25,349 23,802 23,802
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00278 0.00303 0.00303
Wald test for exogeneity 1.036 0.556
Prob. 0.309 0.456
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 1 IV probit estimated with maxi-
mum likelihood. ∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have
changed their opinion on news heard over prices with respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−2
denotes the sum of squared changes of inflation over from months t-2 to t-8. σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
rep-
resents the sum of squared changes of inflation expectations of professional forecasters in
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
denotes
the sum of squared changes of mean inflation expectations of consumers in the Michigan
Survey from months t-2 to t-8. AFEi,t−6 stands for the individual absolute forecast error
made with the prediction of the first interview |(pit+6 − Ei,t−6(pit+6))|, instrumented with
the error made with the annualized 6-months inflation rate between the interviews.
Figure 2: Marginal Effect of the CPI Inflation Variance on Inflation Expectations
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Notes: The graph shows marginal effects of the CPI inflation variance on the likelihood of an inflation
expectations update at rising values of the variance. The y-axis measures the marginal effects which
depends on the level of inflation volatility depicted on the x-axis. Shaded areas are 95% confidence inter-
vals. The left picture shows the marginal effect on updating quantitative short-run inflation expectations,
while the right picture shows the effect on an update of qualitative expectations.
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Table 6: Updating One-Year-Ahead Quantitative Inflation Expectations and Non-Linear
Volatility Effects
(1) (2) (3)
∆(Newsprices)it 0.045* 0.047* 0.047**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
σ2pi,t−2 0.001
(0.016)
(σ2pi,t−2)
2 0.001
(0.002)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.296*
(0.179)
(σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
)2 -0.122
(0.255)
σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
-0.011
(0.018)
(σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
)2 0.002
(0.002)
Observations 24,021 24,021 24,021
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00117 0.00157 0.00131
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. ∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether individuals have changed their opinion on news heard
over prices with respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−2 denotes the
sum of squared changes of inflation over from months t-2 to t-8.
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of inflation ex-
pectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
denotes
the sum of squared changes of mean inflation expectations of con-
sumers in the Michigan Survey from months t-2 to t-8.
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Table 7: Updating One-Year-Ahead Qualitative Inflation Expectations and Non-Linear
Volatility Effects
(1) (2) (3)
∆(Newsprices)it 0.011 0.008 0.0102
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
σ2pi,t−2 -0.078*
(0.042)
(σ2pi,t−2)
2 0.011***
(0.004)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.122
(0.508)
(σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
)2 0.298
(0.754)
σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
-0.025
(0.0347)
(σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
)2 0.006
(0.004)
Observations 25,349 25,349 25,349
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00451 0.00307 0.00347
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. ∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether individuals have changed their opinion on news heard
over prices with respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−2 denotes the
sum of squared changes of inflation over from months t-2 to t-8.
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of inflation ex-
pectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
denotes
the sum of squared changes of mean inflation expectations of con-
sumers in the Michigan Survey from months t-2 to t-8.
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Table 8: Updating One-Year-Ahead Quantitative Inflation Expectations and News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.071*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.073***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
∆(Newsheard)it 0.011** 0.011
(0.005) (0.009)
∆(Newsprices)it 0.015* 0.006
(0.008) (0.012)
∆(V olume)t−1 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
∆(Newsprices_high)it 0.013
(0.008)
∆(Newsprices_low)it 0.028
(0.018)
∆(Newsprices_bad)it 0.015
(0.009)
∆(Newsprices_good)it 0.020
(0.015)
Observations 24,021 24,021 11,710 11,710 24,021 24,021
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00163 0.00156 0.00209 0.00230 0.00159 0.00158
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of infla-
tion expectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the
last two quarters. ∆(Newsheard)it is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed
their opinion on news heard in general with respect to the first interview. ∆(Newsprices)it indicates
changes in news heard about prices. ∆(V olume)t−1 denotes the change in the volume of media news
on inflation within the past six months, starting in the last observed period. ∆(Newsprices_high)it,
∆(Newsprices_low)it, ∆(Newsprices_good)it and ∆(Newsprices_bad)it denote changes in news heard
on rising/falling inflation and prices as well as favorable and unfavorable news.
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Table 9: Updating One-Year-Ahead Qualitative Inflation Expectations and News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.116* 0.116* 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.116* 0.115*
(0.060) (0.060) (0.072) (0.073) (0.060) (0.060)
∆(Newsheard)it 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.007)
∆(Newsprices)it 0.002 -0.013
(0.013) (0.014)
∆(V olume)t−1 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆(Newsprices_high)it -0.002
(0.014)
∆(Newsprices_low)it 0.021
(0.027)
∆(Newsprices_bad)it -0.006
(0.013)
∆(Newsprices_good)it 0.032
(0.020)
Observations 25,349 25,349 12,578 12,578 25,349 25,349
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00305 0.00303 0.00698 0.00705 0.00306 0.00311
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of infla-
tion expectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the
last two quarters. ∆(Newsheard)it is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed
their opinion on news heard in general with respect to the first interview. ∆(Newsprices)it indicates
changes in news heard about prices. ∆(V olume)t−1 denotes the change in the volume of media news
on inflation within the past six months, starting in the last observed period. ∆(Newsprices_high)it,
∆(Newsprices_low)it, ∆(Newsprices_good)it and ∆(Newsprices_bad)it denote changes in news heard
on rising/falling inflation and prices as well as favorable and unfavorable news.
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Table 10: Updating One-Year-Ahead Quantitative Inflation Expectations and Non-
Linearities between Positive and Negative Updates
Likelihood of an increase (1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5)1
in inflation expectations
∆(Newsprices)it 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.154*** 0.152***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.044) (0.043)
σ2pi,t−2 -0.003 0.009
(0.002) (0.011)
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
-0.072 -0.080
(0.070) (0.185)
σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
-0.007 -0.008
(0.005) (0.015)
AFEi,t−6 -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.008) (0.008)
Observations 17,675 17,675 17,675 17,499 17,499
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00307 0.00330 0.00344
Wald test for exogeneity 0.838 0.846
Prob. 0.360 0.358
Note: Marginal effects for the likelihood of an increase in quantitative inflation expectations with
clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. 1 IV probit estimated with maximum likelihood. ∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy
variable indicating whether individuals have changed their opinion on news heard over prices with
respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−2 denotes the sum of squared changes of inflation over from
months t-2 to t-8. σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of inflation expectations of
professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters.
σ2
pie,1yrcons,t−2
denotes the sum of squared changes of mean inflation expectations of consumers in the
Michigan Survey from months t-2 to t-8. AFEi,t−6 stands for the individual absolute forecast error
made with the prediction of the first interview |(pit+6−Ei,t−6(pit+6))|, instrumented with the error
made with the annualized 6-months inflation rate between the interviews.
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4.3 Explaining Individual Forecast Errors
After analyzing the factors that may trigger an updating of short-run and long-run ex-
pectations in the previous section, we next evaluate forecast errors calculated from one-
year-ahead quantitative inflation expectations for those individuals.
Figure 3 presents a Boxplot of individual forecast errors. Over the estimation period
starting in 1987m10, errors are about zero on average, with the exception of largely
negative forecast errors at the start of the financial crisis in 2008, when actual and expected
inflation moved temporarily in opposite directions.20 Furthermore, individual forecast
errors have slightly more mass on the negative side. This suggests that more individuals
overestimated, rather than underestimated, inflation during the sample period.
Figure 3: Boxplot of Individual Forecast Errors
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The results in the previous sections give evidence of information frictions affecting
individuals’ attentiveness towards inflation in line with the theoretical hypotheses H1-H3.
However, the question remains whether more attentiveness towards inflation, resulting in
a higher probability of updating inflation forecasts, also coincides with a higher forecast
20Forecast errors since 1987m10 have a mean of -0.572 and standard deviation of 3.418, with a minimum
of -19.254 and a maximum of 7.703. Hence, on statistical grounds, given standard levels of confidence,
this calculated mean is not different from zero.
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accuracy. In short: Does updating improve the forecast accuracy? Therefore, we next
analyze how absolute forecast errors regarding inflation change when short-run inflation
expectations were updated between interviews as opposed to the case when no update
occurred.
Table 11: Individual Changes in Absolute Forecast Errors Conditional on Updating
Mean Median SD Obs T-test for T-test for
mean = 0 equal. of means
All -0.61 -0.11 4.14 24,385 – –
short-run quant. updated -0.85 -0.38 4.78 17,900 -23.67*** 15.13***
short-run quant. not updated 0.06 0.04 0.96 6,485 4.933*** –
short-run qual. updated -0.93 -0.37 4.33 9,176 -20.68*** 9.66***
short-run qual. not updated -0.41 -0.03 4.02 15,209 -12.48*** –
Note: Summary statistics for the truncated sample from 1987m10-2011m11. SD denotes the standard
errors and Obs the number of observations. The t-statistics give the result of a test against the null
hypothesis that the change forecast errors is equal to zero and for an equality of means test between the
groups, respectively. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% level.
Table 12: Changes in Absolute Forecast Errors Conditional on Updating and News
News Variable Mean SD Obs T-test for T-test for
mean = 0 equal. of means
No economic news observed -0.96 5.31 6,995 -15.06*** -2.47**
Some economic news observed -0.78 4.41 10,905 -18.36*** –
Observed news on high prices/inflation -0.02 4.33 849 -0.115 –
Observed news on low prices/inflation -1.15 4.89 164 -3.01*** –
Note: Summary statistics for the truncated sample from 1987m10-2011m11 conditional on the updating
of quantitative short-run inflation expectations. SD denotes the standard errors and Obs the number of
observations. The t-statistics give the result of a test against the null hypothesis that the change forecast
errors is equal to zero and for an equality of means test between the groups, respectively. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% level.
Table 11 presents summary statistics for the individual changes in absolute forecast
errors between interviews. Including all observations, the statistics show that, on aver-
age, absolute forecast errors decrease between interviews.21 This suggests that in our
sample average quantitative inflation expectations are more accurate in the second inter-
view compared to the first interview. However, when we distinguish between individuals
that updated either their quantitative or their qualitative inflation expectations and those
that did not update, the summary statistics show that absolute forecast errors decrease
21This finding is also reported in Anderson et al. (2010) who relate changes in forecast errors between
interviews to socio-demographic characteristics.
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strongly after an update of inflation expectations. In the case when quantitative inflation
expectations have not been updated, the absolute forecast error even increases. All these
changes are significant at the 1% level. Hence, the summary statistics give tentative evi-
dence that, on average, an update of inflation expectations improves the forecast accuracy
regarding inflation.22
Table 12 complements the observation of Table 11 by additionally looking at the effect
of observing news. We see that observing economic news in general is not necessarily
beneficial for the inflation forecast accuracy in terms of mean improvements of absolute
forecast errors, although there is large heterogeneity in the sample. However, if we look
closer at news on inflation, we see that the improvement in terms of higher forecast
precision is much lower when news on higher prices are perceived as compared to news
on lower prices. Hearing news on lower prices or inflation improves the forecast error by
more than 1 percentage point, albeit with a large standard deviation. While the change
in forecast errors upon perception of news on high prices is not significantly different from
zero, the improvement in forecast accuracy after observing news on low prices or inflation
is significant at the 1% level.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present several robustness checks for our main results regarding the
propensity to update short-run qualitative inflation expectations. First, we check whether
our results are affected by the sample period chosen and re-estimate our models for the
full sample (1978m1-2011m11). Second, we account for a possible attrition bias with
respect to both question and interview attrition using the Heckman correction. Finally,
we check whether our results are affected by the magnitude of the adjustment of inflation
22Although the Michigan survey asks about expectations on prices in general, it is possible that respon-
dents relate their answers to their “personal” or demographic-specific inflation experience. If that were
the case, we should evaluate forecast errors with respect to individual, rather than aggregate inflation.
While Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) document some heterogeneity in inflation rates across sociodemographic
groups in the US, in a different data set Pfajfar and Santoro (2009) report only minor differences in group-
specific inflation rates. Nevertheless, more socioeconomically less advantaged groups seem more likely to
forecast their group-specific, rather than aggregate inflation. We leave this issue for further research.
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expectations and re-estimate the models for changes larger than 1 or 5 percentage points
within six months.23
Overall, our conclusions remain unaffected throughout all those variations. When
estimating the models for the full sample period (1978m1-2011m11), the effect of inflation
volatility variables on the propensity to update expectations gains statistical significance.
The effect of news on inflation on the updating of expectations diminishes, which may be
due to less media reports in the beginning of our sample period.
When accounting for attrition of the respondents with respect to being selected into
the rotating panel and to answering the question on inflation expectations, we find that
estimation results change only marginally.24 This is not surprising as only 5.7% of the
respondents that were re-interviewed failed to report an updated figure for inflation ex-
pectations. In addition, we find only a low support for the selection equation as identified
through the insignificance of the Wald-test.
Finally, we control for the minimum size of adjustments in inflation expectations and
re-calculate updating shares of quantitative inflation expectations of more than 1 and 5
percentage points, respectively. Calculating and plotting these alternative updating fre-
quencies, we find that the updating shares are substantially lower and reveal a higher time
variation, suggesting that larger updates occur much less frequently and look more like
the qualitative updating measure (see Tables A.5-A.6 and Figure A.2 in the Appendix).
This is as expected, as we demonstrated beforehand that qualitative adjustments in ex-
pectations are correlated with a substantial quantitative adjustment. The question hence
remains if the selection of big and very big movements in expectation has consequences
for our empirical results. Regarding the probability to update quantitative short-run in-
flation expectations by more than 1 or 5 percentage points, we find that macroeconomic
determinants become economically more important, while the news channel becomes less
relevant.
23For reasons of space limitations, we present estimation results for the models including the volatility
of professionals’ inflation forecast and the change in inflation news heard by the individual, i.e. the
specification in Table 4, column 2. Robustness checks for all other models are available upon request.
24For the selection equation we add further socioeconomic characteristics, i.e. personal status, regional
characteristics, race, number of kids and number of adults in the household.
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Table 13: Robustness Checks for the Updating of Short-Run Quantitative Inflation Ex-
pectations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Baseline Full Sample Attrition > 1% > 5%
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
0.073*** 0.045*** 0.071*** 0.133*** 0.081***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.016) (0.045) (0.031)
∆(Newsprices)it 0.015* 0.011 0.015* 0.004 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 24,021 39,374 25,323 24,021 24,021
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00156 0.00234 – 0.00762 0.0229
ρ – – -0.0675 – –
Wald-Test p-value – – 0.917 – –
Note: Marginal effects for the probability of an update of short-run quantitative inflation expecta-
tions, with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. The Baseline model corresponds to the model in Table 4, column 2.
σ2
pie,1yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of inflation expectations of professional forecasters
in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. ∆(Newsprices)it is
a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed their opinion on news heard over
prices with respect to the first interview.
Table 14: Robustness of the Effect of Absolute Forecast Errors on the Updating of Short-
Run Quantitative Inflation Expectations
(1) (2) (3)
No instrument IV Probit IV Probit
Two-Step ML Estimator
∆(Newsprices)it 0.017** 0.053* 0.053**
(0.008) (0.029) (0.025)
AFEi,t−6 0.026*** 0.087*** 0.087***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 23,802 23,802 23,802
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0239 – –
Wald test for exogeneity – 31.11 4.411
Prob. – 0.000 0.0357
Note: Marginal effects for the probability of an update of short-run quantitative inflation expec-
tations, with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicating whether
individuals have changed their opinion on news heard over prices with respect to the first inter-
view. AFEi,t−6 measures the individual absolute forecast error regarding inflation made in the
first interview.
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The results presented in Table 14 additionally evaluate the robustness of the impact
from the absolute forecast error made at the first interview on the likelihood of an expecta-
tion update at the second interview (H3) on the instrumental approach. The first column
shows the result without any instrumentation, the second column gives the estimate with
a two-step IV probit regression, and the final column gives the estimate with maximum
likelihood IV probit also shown in Table 8. The results suggest that the significance of
the effect does not depend on the instrumental variable approach, but the size of the
coefficient increases considerably when we use IV probit estimation. At the same time,
the Wald test for exogeneity suggests that instrumenting AFEi,t−6 may be appropriate.
5 Conclusion
Our study contributes to the understanding of the formation of inflation expectations of
consumers. Employing the rotating panel structure of the Michigan Survey of Consumers
allows us to identify whether individuals adjust their expectations within a period of six
months.
This allows us to explore the relevance of determinants derived from imperfect infor-
mation models that may trigger an updating of inflation expectations and their impact on
the forecast accuracy. Specifically, we find that a rising volatility of professionals’ infla-
tion forecasts triggers an updating of consumers’ inflation expectations, suggesting that
rational inattention or time-varying sticky information may affect the expectation forma-
tion process. In addition, individuals’ own forecast errors play a role. Perceived news on
inflation induce adjustments in quantitative short-run consumers’ inflation expectations
but has no effect on qualitative and long-run expectations. With regard to the effect of
imperfect information on forecast accuracy, we find that an update of short-run inflation
expectations reduces the forecast error by up to 1%.
Overall, our results suggest that the updating of consumers’ inflation expectations may
be partly predicted with theories of imperfect information. However, while we provide
evidence in favor of information rigidities, the low explanatory power of the regressions
clearly reveals that more has to be done. One aspect might be that while volatility
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increases attention and thus raises the probability of updating expectations, volatility, at
the same time, reduces the forecastability of the underlying series. This effect could work
in the opposite direction and thus reduce the probability of adjusting expectations.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of the optimal degree of attention κ∗
The problem of optimal inattention can be stated as follows:
min
σ2
∆|si ,κ≥0
E∆,si
[
(piei − pie,∗)2
]
+ µ(N)κ (A.1)
subject to equations (1) and (2), si = ∆ + εi and the information constraint
1
2
log2
(
2pieσ2∆
)− 1
2
log2
(
2pieσ2∆|si
) ≤ κ (A.2)
Agents minimize (A.1) over the joint distribution of the true inflation state and the signal,
where the joint distribution is chosen to be Gaussian due to the assumption of Gaussian
states. Using the law of iterated expectations and because the conditional variance of a
Gaussian random variable is constant, the objective function can be written in terms of
the conditional variance of inflation:
min
σ2
∆|si ,κ≥0
E∆,si
[
(E∆[pi
e,∗|si]− pie,∗)2
]
+ µ(N)κ
= min
σ2
∆|si ,κ≥0
Esi [V ar(pi
e,∗|si)] + µ(N)κ
= min
σ2
∆|si ,κ≥0
V ar(pie,∗|si) + µ(N)κ
= min
σ2
∆|si ,κ≥0
θ2σ2∆|si + µ(N)κ (A.3)
We thus get the following Lagrangian and corresponding first-order conditions:
L = θ2σ2∆|si + µ(N)κ− λ
[
1
2
lnσ2∆
ln 2
− 1
2
lnσ2∆|si
ln 2
− κ
]
(A.4)
∂L
∂σ2∆|si
= θ2 +
1
2
λ
1
ln 2
1
σ2∆|si
!
= 0 (A.5)
∂L
∂κ
= µ(N) + λ
!
= 0 ⇒ λ = −µ(N) (A.6)
40
Using (A.6) in (A.5) then gives the following expression for the conditional variance of
inflation σ2∆|si :
σ2∆|si =
µ(N)
2 ln(2)θ2
(A.7)
Finally, substituting for σ2∆|si from (A.7) in the information constraint in (A.2) gives an
expression for optimal attention towards inflation:
κ∗ =

1
2
log2
(
2 ln(2)θ2σ2∆
µ(N)
)
if 2 ln(2)θ
2σ2∆
µ(N)
≥ 1
0 otherwise
(A.8)
where the fraction (2 ln(2)θ2σ2∆)/µ(N) gives the marginal benefit of paying attention to
inflation.
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6.2 News Observed by Consumers
Figure A.1: Shares of Consumers Reporting News Heard
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(a) News on Business Conditions in General
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(b) News on Price Changes
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(c) News on Higher Prices
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(d) News on Lower Prices
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(e) Bad News on Price Changes
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(f) Good News on Price Changes
Notes: The graphs show the share of individual consumers that observed specific news in each
monthly cross-section. Shaded areas are recession phases as identified by the NBER.
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6.3 Updating of Long-Run Inflation Expectations
Table A.1: Updating Five-to-Ten-Years-Ahead Quantitative Inflation Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5)1
∆(Newsprices)it -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.024)
σ2pi,t−2 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.007)
σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
0.028 -0.025
(0.141) (0.298)
σ2
pie,5−10yrcons,t−2
0.007*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.006)
AFEi,t−6 0.033*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.006)
Observations 19,225 17,516 18,993 18,487 16,802
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00507 0.00507 0.00550
Wald test for exogeneity 0.350 0.335
Prob. 0.554 0.563
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 1 IV probit estimated with maximum likelihood.
∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed their opinion
on news heard over prices with respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−1 denotes the sum of squared
changes of inflation over the months t-2 to t-8. σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of
long-run inflation expectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) over the last two quarters. σ2
pie,5−10yrcons,t−2
denotes the sum of squared changes of mean long-run
inflation expectations of consumers in the Michigan Survey over the months t-2 to t-8. AFEi,t−6
stands for the individual absolute forecast error made with the prediction of the first interview
|(pit+6 − Ei,t−6(pit+6))|, instrumented with the error made with the annualized 6-months inflation
rate between the interviews.
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Table A.2: Updating Five-to-Ten-Years-Ahead Qualitative Inflation Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5)1
∆(Newsprices)it -0.006 -0.013 -0.009 -0.038 -0.040
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.054) (0.050)
σ2pi,t−2 0.007*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.006)
σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
-0.039 0.126
(0.074) (0.277)
σ2
pie,5−10yrcons,t−2
-0.000 0.003
(0.002) (0.009)
AFEi,t−6 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 20,415 18,662 20,174 19,007 17,291
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0199 0.0169 0.0176
Wald test for exogeneity 3.367 4.577
Prob. 0.0665 0.0324
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 1 IV probit estimated with maximum likelihood.
∆(Newsprices)it is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed their opinion
on news heard over prices with respect to the first interview. σ2pi,t−1 denotes the sum of squared
changes of inflation over the months t-2 to t-8. σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared changes of
long-run inflation expectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) over the last two quarters. σ2
pie,5−10yrcons,t−2
denotes the sum of squared changes of mean long-run
inflation expectations of consumers in the Michigan Survey over the months t-2 to t-8. AFEi,t−6
stands for the individual absolute forecast error made with the prediction of the first interview
|(pit+6 − Ei,t−6(pit+6))|, instrumented with the error made with the annualized 6-months inflation
rate between the interviews.
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Table A.3: Updating Five-to-Ten-Years-Ahead Quantitative Inflation Expectations and
News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
0.031 0.028 -0.318 -0.320 0.031 0.030
(0.140) (0.141) (0.202) (0.202) (0.140) (0.140)
∆(Newsheard)it 0.004 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
∆(Newsprices)it -0.003 -0.007
(0.008) (0.010)
∆(V olume)t−1 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
∆(Newsprices_high)it -0.006
(0.010)
∆(Newsprices_low)it 0.011
(0.024)
∆(Newsprices_bad)it -0.006
(0.010)
∆(Newsprices_good)it 0.010
(0.024)
Observations 17,516 17,516 11,616 11,616 17,516 17,516
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.00509 0.00507 0.00425 0.00427 0.00509 0.00509
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared
changes of long-run inflation expectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. ∆(Newsheard)it is a dummy variable indicating
whether individuals have changed their opinion on news heard in general with respect to the first
interview. ∆(Newsprices)it indicates changes in news heard about prices. ∆(V olume)t−1 de-
notes the change in the volume of media news on inflation within the past six months, starting in
the last observed period. ∆(Newsprices_high)it, ∆(Newsprices_low)it, ∆(Newsprices_good)it
and ∆(Newsprices_bad)it denote changes in news heard on rising/falling inflation and prices as
well as favorable and unfavorable news.
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Table A.4: Updating Five-to-Ten-Years-Ahead Qualitative Inflation Expectations and
News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
-0.037 -0.039 0.096 0.093 -0.038 -0.038
(0.075) (0.074) (0.197) (0.198) (0.073) (0.073)
∆(Newsheard)it 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.005)
∆(Newsprices)it -0.013 -0.019
(0.013) (0.014)
∆(V olume)t−1 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
∆(Newsprices_high)it -0.016
(0.015)
∆(Newsprices_low)it -0.002
(0.016)
∆(Newsprices_bad)it -0.016
(0.015)
∆(Newsprices_good)it -0.000
(0.015)
Observations 18,662 18,662 12,461 12,461 18,662 18,662
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0168 0.0169 0.0168 0.0171 0.0169 0.0169
Note: Marginal effects with clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. σ2
pie,5−10yrprof,t−1
represents the sum of squared
changes of long-run inflation expectations of professional forecasters in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) over the last two quarters. ∆(Newsheard)it is a dummy variable indicating
whether individuals have changed their opinion on news heard in general with respect to the first
interview. ∆(Newsprices)it indicates changes in news heard about prices. ∆(V olume)t−1 de-
notes the change in the volume of media news on inflation within the past six months, starting in
the last observed period. ∆(Newsprices_high)it, ∆(Newsprices_low)it, ∆(Newsprices_good)it
and ∆(Newsprices_bad)it denote changes in news heard on rising/falling inflation and prices as
well as favorable and unfavorable news.
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6.4 Updating Shares with Quantitative Changes Above 1% or 5%
Table A.5: Summary Statistics of Monthly Updating Shares with Quant. Updates > 1%
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Short-run expectations, 1 year, update>1 % 289 0.56 0.08 0.39 0.83
Short-run expectations, 1 year, qualitative answer 289 0.38 0.09 0.16 0.67
Long-run expectations, 5-10 years,update>1 % 255 0.48 0.07 0.28 0.64
Long-run expectations, 5-10 years, qualitative answer 255 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.34
Notes: Obs denotes the sample size, SD is the standard deviation while Min and Max represent
the minimum and maximum values.
Table A.6: Summary Statistics of Monthly Updating Shares with Quant. Updates > 5%
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Short-run expectations, 1 year, update>5 % 289 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.55
Short-run expectations, 1 year, qualitative answer 289 0.38 0.09 0.16 0.67
Long-run expectations, 5-10 years,update>5 % 255 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.26
Long-run expectations, 5-10 years, qualitative answer 255 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.34
Notes: Obs denotes the sample size, SD is the standard deviation while Min and Max represent
the minimum and maximum values.
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Figure A.2: Updating Shares for Quantitative Inflation Expectations
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(a) Short-run expectations, 1 year
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(b) Long-run expectations, 5-10 years
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(c) Short-run expectations, update>1 %
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(d) Long-run expectations, update>1 %
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(e) Short-run expectations, update>5 %
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(f) Long-run expectations, update>5 %
Notes: The graphs show the share of individual consumers that change their inflation expectations
within six months together with a smoothing polynomial trend. Shaded areas are recession phases
as identified by the NBER. The share is calculated by taking all individuals that adjusted their
expectations during the last six months and dividing them by the overall number of individuals
that have been re-interviewed.
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